INTRODUCTION
Copper, oil, and many other natural resources are nonrenewable at least on any time horizon of relevance to the human race. As the easiest-to-find and richest deposits are exploited, many anticipate that the real price of mineral commodities will rise reflecting their increasing scarcity. However, dozens of empirical investigations using modern econometric techniques have failed to detect statistically significant upward trends in the long-run real price of mineral commodities, as Krautkreamer (1998) notes in his review of this literature. The standard explanation is that new technologies, the discovery of new deposits, recycling, and other forces have more than offset the cost-increasing effects of depletion over the past 130 years.
In this earlier work, nominal prices are almost always reported in U.S. currency, and converted to real prices using the U.S. producer price index and other standard deflators. The choice of deflator is rarely explained in any detail, and in a few cases not even identified. Krautkreamer (1998) , for example, in his extensive review of the literature only mentions his choice of deflator (the U.S. consumer price index) in a footnote. A more serious problem, which provides the motivation for this study, is that a growing number of studies (see Table 1 ) have found that the traditional price deflators overstate inflation. This paper reassesses the long-run real price trends for one nonrenewable resource, copper, using deflators designed to correct for this bias.
Copper is a good choice for a pilot study for several reasons. First, it is an important metal. Recently the world has produced 13-15 million tons of refined copper annually (World Bureau of Metal Statistics, annual), worth nearly 25 billon dollars. Only the iron and steel, aluminium and gold industries have higher sales. Second, there are reliable and consistent data on annual copper prices back to 1870 (and even before).
Third, copper is a relatively homogeneous good. Unlike petroleum, for example, with its many grades, refined copper is 99.99+ per cent pure copper.
1 Fourth, the cost of transporting copper is a small percentage of its final price. Fifth, copper is sold on global markets rather than in various regional markets. As a result, the prices in the two main markets, the US and London Metal Exchange (LME), move together within the bounds set by the cost of transporting copper across the Atlantic. Over the entire period, the simple correlation coefficient between the LME and U.S. producer price, both expressed in U.S. dollars and deflated by the conventional CPI, is 0.90. Sixth, the copper market is reasonably competitive. During certain periods, collusive activities by producers or price controls by governments have affected prices. But, thanks to a number of scholars- Herfindahl (1959) and Howie (2002) , for example-who have studied the copper industry, these periods are well documented, allowing one to control for their influence.
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The analysis begins in Section 2 with a brief review of the theory and previous empirical evidence on long-run trends in resources prices. Section 3 presents the reasons why the standard deflators overestimate inflation during recent decades, and hence the adjustments required to eliminate the bias. Section 4 considers the inflation bias before 1950. Section 5 estimates the real, real price of copper and carries out a series of robustness tests. Section 6 highlights the main findings, examines some of the implications, raises a few caveats, and makes suggestions for further research.
RESOURCE PRICE CHANGES: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
One of the main reasons for assessing long-term price trends for nonrenewable commodities is the concern that depletion over time is increasing their scarcity. Real prices are the most readily available of the few useful indicators of trends in resource availability.
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The formal theory in this area dates back to Hotelling (1931) . His seminal article considers the optimal output over time for a mine with a fixed quantity of mineral reserves. Hotelling shows that the mine will behave differently than other firms whose production is not ultimately limited by an exhaustible resource. In particular, it will 2 Howie (2002, ch.4) corrects for price distortions introduced by subsidization and the exercise of market power over the 1900-1997 period, and finds this produces less of a decline in the long-run trend in real copper prices.
expand its output during any period only up to the point where the cost of producing an additional unit plus user costs equals the market price, where user costs reflect the present value of the future profits forgone by producing an additional unit of output now.
Hotelling also demonstrates that user costs must rise by r per cent per year, where r per cent is the market rate of return on investments that are of similar risk and in other ways comparable to an investment in mineral reserves. If this were not the case, if for example the return on comparable investments were higher, then mine owners would have an incentive to exploit all of their reserves during the current period (Hotelling imposes no constraints on output other than the total quantity of reserves) and invest the profits in other investments. This behavior would raise the price of the mineral commodity in the future and so increase user costs. Not until the growth in user costs was comparable to the return on other similar assets, would mines have an incentive to stop diverting output from the future to the present. Should the pendulum swing too far, so that the user costs increased at more than r per cent a year, mines would want to hold onto their reserves. The diversion of output from the present to the future would slow the pace at which user costs rise until the latter was growing at r per cent a year.
Some students of Hotelling argue that his analysis implies that the prices of mineral commodities will rise at r per cent a year. However, this is true only if extraction and processing costs are zero, or if extraction and processing costs also rise at r per cent a year. Still, if the user costs of a mineral commodity are rising persistently, eventually its price has to rise as well.
However, Hotelling's results depend on a number of strong assumptions. In his model, for example, there is no exploration or additions to reserves, no technological change, and no uncertainty. Modified Hotelling models that relax his assumptions, not surprisingly, no longer make clear predictions regarding user costs and prices. These variables can rise or fall over time. Surveys of this literature are found in Bohi and Toman (1984) and in Krautkraemer (1998) .
This means that empirical studies are needed to determine if the influence of technological change, new discoveries, and other developments pushing real mineral 3 Others are real user costs and the real marginal costs of extraction and processing (see Tilton, 2002, ch. 3).
commodity prices down have more than offset the effects of mineral depletion and other factors tending to increase mineral scarcity over time. Many such studies have been carried out, 4 and generally they find that prices since the 1870s, despite quite large fluctuations in the short run, have followed either constant or (as in the case of copper) falling long-run trends.
INFLATION BIAS IN RECENT DECADES
Claims that the official price series in the United States and elsewhere overstate inflation arose over 40 years ago (Stigler, 1961) , but had little impact on the collection and reporting of the official U.S. price indexes over the next 35 years. In the mid 1990s, the interest in price indexes re-emerged and the Boskin Commission was set up with a mandate to evaluate and suggest improvements in the CPI. It found that the CPI overestimates inflation by some 1.1 percentage points per year (Boskin et al., 1996) .
Subsequently, a string of studies of the inflation bias has come forth, applying different estimation technologies (Table 1) .
The renewed interest in price indexes has been spurred by a growing realisation of the adverse consequences of incorrectly measuring inflation. As noted by Boskin et al. (1998: 3) : "Accurately measuring prices and their change, inflation, is central to almost every economic issue. There is virtually no other issue that is so endemic to every field of economics. Some examples include aggregate economic growth and productivity; industry prices and productivity; government taxes and spending programs that are indexed to inflation; budget deficits and debt; monetary policy; real financial returns; real wages; real median incomes and poverty rates; and the competitive performance of economies."
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To the above list one should add the ramifications for deriving real price trends for primary commodities, the focus of this paper, and the related issue of trends in the barter terms of trade for commodity-exporting countries.
4 See, for example, Potter and Christy (1962) , Barnett and Morse (1963) , Manthy (1978) , Pindyck (1978 Pindyck ( , 1999 , Smith (1979) , Slade (1982 Slade ( , 1988 , and Howie (2002) . 5 Also see Gordon (1990: 8-14) . Among the areas listed, the question of whether the slowdown in productivity growth in the United States since the mid 1970s is overestimated has attracted the most attention. See, for example, Stiroh (1999, 2000) , Onliner and Sichel (2000) , and Gordon (2000) .
Sources of bias
There are three main reasons why the U.S. and other price indexes overstate inflation:
Substitution bias. In constructing the price series, the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) uses a modified Laspeyres index. In this type of index, the weights of the different items are derived from consumption expenditure surveys from a particular base year.
This base-year "basket" is re-estimated infrequently: in the case of consumer goods, only about every tenth year (Abraham, 2003) . When there are shifts in relative prices over time, buyers substitute towards items with falling relative prices, signifying the need for a change in the weights, which the fixed-weight Laspeyres index ignores. Boskin et al. (1998: 7) finds the use of such an index "extreme, unrealistic, and unnecessary", and estimates it has caused the CPI to overestimate inflation by 0.4 percentage point per annum in recent decades.
New goods bias.
There are at least three flaws in the official CPI and PPI when it comes to handling new products on the market. The first arises because new products are introduced in the indexes with a long lag. A frequently cited example is the cellular phone, which appeared in 1983, but was not included in the CPI until 1998. Other examples include room air conditioners, VCRs, and personal computers, which were all included "years after they were first sold in the market place" (Gordon and Griliches, 1997: 85) . As a result, the accumulated price decreases for these products during the intervening years, estimated at around 80 per cent, were not captured in the official price indexes (Boskin et al., 1997) .
A second flaw occurs because improved versions of many products are introduced as completely new goods, which means that the quality improvements they reflect are ignored. A third flaw arises because new products are included in the indexes without allowing for the consumer surplus gain (compensating variation) they generate (Hausman, 1997; . The Boskin report makes no attempt to correct for this third source of bias. 6 The size of the new-product bias arising from the first two sources, it estimates to be in the range of 0.20 to 0.30 percentage points per year (Boskin et al., 1997 : Table 1 ).
The pure-quality bias. (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000) .
Such developments have helped raise the awareness of quality improvements in other product categories as well.
The Engle-curve method
The method used by Boskin et al. and Gordon for estimating inflation bias has been dubbed "down the trench", as it is based on very detailed and laborious examinations of individual products. A much simpler approach, the Engel curve method, was introduced a few years ago.
Authors using this method (see Table 1 ) take the negative relationship between household income and the share of income spent on food (the Engel curve) as the starting point. With raising per capita income, the average share of food in total household 7 It is important to note that the quality improvements estimated by Gordon (1990) exclude intangible quality changes, such as better sound in video recorders.
expenditures has declined steadily in the US (from about 27 per cent in the early 1950s to 13 per cent in the mid 1990s). However, there is little reason to expect that the food share of household expenditure at a given real income level should change over time, after controlling for changes in the relative price of food, income distribution, the demographic composition of the population, and other relevant variables.
The estimation method can be illustrated with the help of a simple graph depicting Engel curves (F/Y) for two consecutive years ( Figure 1 ). The available studies show a drift of the Engel curve to the left over time, from say (F/Y) t to (F/Y) t+1 . That is, for a given level of real household income (as deflated by the official CPI), the food share has declined over time. They conclude that the observed drift is due to overestimation of inflation, and use it to estimate the bias in the CPI. In Figure 1 , the bias is given by ∆Y/Y t . 
Y t Household income
Official responses
Results that upset conventional wisdom and established practice tend to receive mixed reviews. This was case with the Boskin report. The first reactions by officials and researchers at the BLS were largely sceptical. Now, most of the recommendations advanced by the Boskin Commission are officially endorsed. The Commission recommended the use of a superlative Törnquist index, which is similar to the Fischer ideal price index (Boskin et al., 1998) . The Törnquist index is based on averaging (geometrically) the weights from the base and the most current year, which reduces the substitution bias inherent in the Laspeyres index. 8 The BLS introduced the use of a superlative index in 2002, although only for some "strata" (sub-indexes) in the CPI index (Abraham, 2003) . The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has also recently switched to a superlative index (Moulton, 2000) .
BLS officials now also agree that previous methods for handling new products lead to upward bias in the CPI (Moulton, 2000; Abraham, 2003) , as argued by the Boskin Commission. New practices have been established or are underway. One important change since 2002 is that the weights used to aggregate the CPI indexes are now updated every two years instead of every tenth year (Abraham, 2003) .
When it comes to the third bias, pure quality changes, controversy still lingers, both regarding estimation methods and the numbers advanced by the Boskin
Commission. The Commission (Boskin et al., 1996) relied mainly on the hedonic method for separating quality-induced price changes from pure inflation. With this method, price changes for a good are regressed against quality changes, as reflected by technical specifications (such as horsepower, fuel consumption, and expected life in the case of automobiles). The share of the price increases accounted for by changes in such technical characteristics is attributed to quality improvements and the remaining share to inflation.
Objections to the Boskin report on this issue have focused on three related points.
First, the method it uses for some product categories, it is claimed, is subjective and judgmental. Second, quality can deteriorate as well as improve, and for many goods and services no reliable methods for estimating quality changes exist (Schultze and Mackie, 2002) . Third, the official indexes have increasingly taken quality changes into account in recent years. Examples include computer software, automobiles and telecommunication equipment (Stewart and Reed, 1999) . 9 Boskin (2000) maintains that the Commission's original assessments of quality improvement hold, and that the recent inclusion into the official statistics of quality changes for a few products is insufficient. Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) also identify
further adjustment for quality changes as one of the two top priorities for the agencies producing and using price series. Outsiders are split between those who are sceptical of the estimates from the Boskin Commission (Deaton, 1998; Schultze and Mackie, 2002) and those who find them too conservative (Diewert, 1998; Nordhaus, 1997; Hausman, 2003) .
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In the past few years, researcher at the BLS have themselves made some simulation of bias in the CPI during the past two decades. In one of these studies, Stewart The methods used by the BLS to adjust for quality changes are described in Moulton and Moses (1997) . Moulton (2000) acknowledges that quality change is insufficiently incorporated into the official indexes, that improvement is warranted, and that this is underway. Moreover, it should be noted that the BLS revisions are understated since they take into account only quality changes for a few selected products. The Boskin Commission claims that quality improvements in a long range of other products should also be accounted for.
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Revisions in the official CPI indexes since 1983 probably explain why many studies listed in Table 1 (Gordon, Hamilton and Costa) report a decline in bias over time.
This may also be the reason why Lebow and Rudd (2003) found the overall, and the quality, bias for the recent period 1987-2001 to be somewhat smaller than reported by Boskin et al. (1996) for 1974-95 (Table 1 ).
In summary, there is now wide agreement that the CPI has overestimated inflation for the four decades prior to the mid 1990s, when more important revisions were initiated. Disagreement and uncertainty remain over the size of the bias (as is evident from the large confidence intervals reported by most authors in Table 1 ). On the methodological front, the debate is now largely focused on how to best account for quality change (Schultze, 2003) . It is important, finally, to recall that the historical CPI index has not been revised (Stewart and Reed, 1999) . So all the biases reported for recent decades exist in the price indexes for earlier years. This is particularly important for our purposes, since almost all of the period we are examining is before the 1990s.
INFLATION BIAS BEFORE 1950
There are two main hurdles when it comes to estimating the inflation bias over the 1870- Bosworth (1997) , the quality adjustment made by the BLS lowered the official CPI by between 0.28 and 1.76 percentage points (with a mean of about 1.0) for the year 1995. However, these quality adjustments are for selected goods only and the average is derived on the assumption that all other products had no quality change. This introduces an overall downward bias of unknown size. This estimate nevertheless suggests that unadjusted quality changes in the years before the early 1990s were notable, providing further support for the quality bias estimates of the Boskin Commission.
Earlier estimates "are based on the efforts of economists and economic historians who have created CPI estimates and linked them to the modern series" (McCusker, 2001 ).
This raises questions about the reliability of inflation figures before 1913 (Sahr, 2002) .
Substitution bias and new goods bias
As the BLS has used the Laspeyres since 1917, the substitution bias that it produces clearly dates back to the earliest CPI figures. Similarly, the late introduction of new goods is not a new problem. It seems to have been as pronounced, if not more so, before the 1950s as after. Stigler et al. (1961: 38) cites as examples that "new automobiles were not introduced until 1940, used automobiles.... until 1952", some 40-50 years after they were on the market, and that "refrigerators were introduced only in 1934", probably with an equally long lag. They conclude that: "Our observations suggest that in many cases the need to introduce a new variety of a commodity is felt [by the BLS] only when it becomes impossible to price the old variety because it has disappeared from the outlets".
(Rather the same observation is made by Abraham (2003: 52) , reflecting on the 1990s.)
The only comprehensive study that has estimated inflation bias before 1950 is Costa (2001) . The Engel-curve method she uses takes all technical index-related flaws into account, but not the pure quality bias. As Table 1 
Pure-quality bias
The type of systematic and broad-based estimations of quality change in products and services that the studies cited in Table 1 have undertaken for recent decades does not exist for the period before 1950. The study by Costa, as noted earlier, does not consider quality improvements. This, however, does not mean that information is totally lacking.
For instance, Griliches (1961) estimates that quality improvements accounted for more than half of the price increase that the U.S. Wholesale Price Index (WPI) reported for automobiles over the 1937-1960 period. 12 So less than half the increase was pure inflation. Gordon (1990: 11) cites a study by Mills from 1936, dealing with agricultural machinery and motor cars, that found substantive quality improvements over the period that the WPI had failed to consider. Another study by Rees revealed rapid quality improvements in rails and railway equipment between 1890 and 1914 (Gordon, 1990) .
There is also the celebrated history of lighting by Nordhaus (1997) , the work by Raff and Trajtenberg (1997) , again on automobiles, and some others referred to in Bresnahan and Gordon (1997) and Stigler et al. (1961) . The quantitative estimates of the quality change in the particular goods examined in all these case studies are similar to, or greater than, those reported by the studies listed in Table 1 for later periods.
It is also the case that during the 1920s and 1930s, a long range of what were then technically sophisticated consumer goods, including telephones, radios, and electrical appliances of various types, became widely available for the first time. Clearly there were many quality improvements in such products in the years up to 1950, although they have not been estimated.
There is also an a priori reason to expect that numerous major technological innovations in the past-including electricity, railroad equipment, the internal combustion engine, a wide range of petrochemicals, and communication equipment-led to major quality improvements in many goods with such inputs during the first half of the 20 th century. Gordon (1990: 11-12) conjectures that one would "suspect that existing capital goods deflators significantly overstate quality-corrected inflation in capital goods prices . . . all the way back to the dawn of the industrial age". Nordhaus (1997) arrives at a similar conclusion and provides an exhaustive list of "great inventions" dating back to the 19 th century, whose influence on prices is not reflected in the official indexes.
While there is little reason to believe that quality improvements in technically advanced products were any less pronounced before 1950 than after, the overall bias induced by quality changes may nevertheless have been smaller. Far less quality change tend to occur in what Nordhaus (1997) labels as "run-of-the-mill sectors". According to his estimates, the importance of these sectors has declined from 75 to 28 per cent of the 12 The U.S. Wholesale Price Index became the U.S. Producer Price Index in 1978. It is also notable that the WPI before 1947 contained almost no producer goods (Gordon, 1990: 15) .
U.S. economy between 1800 and 1991. Along with this shift, from standard bulk goods to more technologically sophisticated products, the overall quality bias may have grown.
Although no quantitative data are provided, Gordon (1999: 126) This conjecture is shared by Boskin et al. (1996: 42) for the CPI.
COPPER PRICE TRENDS
This section estimates the trend in real copper prices over the 1870-2000 period using as deflator an adjusted CPI that reduces the reported inflation. In the benchmark case, we take the inflation bias to be 1.0 percentage points a year throughout the period. This number is smaller than the estimates for recent decades reported by most of the studies listed in Table 1 , and slightly above the estimate by Costa for the 1919-35 period (which disregards quality change). It is also the number that Nordhaus (1997) comes up with in his "thought-experiment" (gedankenexperiment). In addition to this benchmark or base case, we subsequently provide alternative estimates of the real price trend for copper, assuming that the CPI bias is 0.5 and 1.5 percentage points. Our objective is not to advocate one particular figure, but to consider a range within which the true bias is likely to fall. We can then explore how the long-run trend in the real price of copper changes as the magnitude of the bias varies over the range of likely possibilities. When no adjustment is made to the CPI, a downward trend is quite apparent. As the annual adjustment to the CPI increases from 0.0 to 1.5 percentage points, a reversal in trend appears to occur, calling into question the presumed decline in real copper prices.
The following sections examine the statistical significance, stationarity, and robustness of these trends. It begins with the base case and then examines how the trends change when the assumptions are altered
The base case
The base case focuses on the real copper prices over the period 1870 to 2000. It considers the average annual U.S. producer price, in the tradition of Potter and Christy (1962) , Barnett and Morse (1963), Manthy (1978) , and Howie (2002) , rather than the comparable LME price of copper. It uses the U.S. CPI to deflate nominal prices. This is in part because this index goes back to 1870 (although the index for 1870-1913, as noted earlier,
is not an official index). Moreover, the inflation bias in the CPI has been studied more thoroughly than in other price indices. Of greatest importance, however, is the fact that the CPI reflects the real price of copper in terms of a representative basket of consumer goods and services. As a result, it more accurately assesses the impact of commodity price trends on the welfare of society-that is, consumers or people in general-than other deflators.
The base case further assumes that the long-run trend in real copper prices is linear and it reduces, as mentioned, the official inflation rate by one percentage point a Table 2 shows that the long-run trend in real copper prices derived with the unadjusted deflator is downward. This decline is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. In contrast, the results for the base case (adjustment by 1.0 percentage point)
suggest that the real price of copper has trended upward over the past 130 years. Though significant only at the 12 per cent level, the estimated parameter for the time variable is positive. 13 A stationary variable has a constant mean and variance over time. A trend stationary variable has a constant mean and variance once its trend is removed. A differenced stationary variable has a constant mean and variance in its first differences. A variable that is not trend stationary may not follow the same trend over time. This means that the true β's in equations 1, 2, and 3 may not be constants, but instead may vary over the period examined. In this case, the estimated β's reflect some hybrid average of the true β's, and as a result are unlikely at any point in time to represent the true long-run trend in prices.
Robustness tests
(1) Alternative Adjustment Factors. The results when we re-estimate equation 1, using annual deductions of 0.5 and 1.5 percentage points from the annual increase in the CPI, are also shown in Table 2 . The lowest estimate of the bias (0.5 points) can be thought of as representing a case where no quality improvements in goods and services occurred over the entire 1870-2000 period. In this case, the only biases in the CPI stem from the use of the fixed-weight Laspeyres index and the delayed introduction of new goods.
According to Stigler (1961) , these flaws plagued the official CPI index from the time it was first introduced in 1917 and all the way to 1999, when it was first modified (Stewart and Reed, 1999) .
The second alternative, a correction of 1.5 percentage points per year, is similar to the upper tail of the range of bias estimates put forth by Boskin et al. (1996) . It also squares with the mid-point estimates derived by Gordon, Hamilton, and Costa for years in the post-1950 period. It is worth noting that the latter two studies do not take quality change into consideration. The one study based on the Engel curve method that does (Bils and Klenow, 2002) reports a higher number for most consumer durables (2.2 points).
An adjustment of 0.5 percentage points suggests that the long-run price trend is downward as when no adjustment is made to the CPI. However, it is no longer significant. With the 1.5 percentage point deduction, the long-run trend is upward, as in the base case, and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.
(2) Alternative Copper Prices. Using the LME price instead of the U.S. producer price does not affect the results, as Table 3 shows. When no adjustment is made to the CPI, the long-run trend in the real LME price of copper is downward and significant at the 1 per cent level. When the CPI is reduced by 1.0 percentage points a year, the longrun trend is upward, and the coefficient on the trend variable is significant at the 6 per cent level. However, the ADF test in this case suggests that the LME price of copper may not be trend stationary, raising the possibility of spurious results. Table 4 , and again indicate a significant downward trend when no adjustment is made to the CPI. When the CPI is reduced by one percentage point a year, the coefficient on the time variable is negative, not positive as with our previous results. However, the estimated time-coefficient is insignificant and the ADF test fails to reject the hypothesis that the series is difference stationary, signifying that the results may be spurious.
(5) Excluding Non-competitive Market Periods. According to Herfindahl (1959) and Howie (2002) , interventions by governments and collusive actions by producers distorted the market price for copper during the following periods: 1870-83, 1888-90, 1900-01, 1914-18, 1929-35, 1939-57, and 1962-64. There are (at least) two, quite different, ways to take account of such market manipulations. The choice depends on how one believes temporary market interference affects long term prices.
One possibility is that the long-term price trend is unaffected, on the grounds that temporary price spikes occurring during periods of market interference are entirely offset during subsequent periods. So once they are over, a competitive market for some time generates prices below the level that would otherwise have prevailed. Successful efforts to raise copper prices artificially reduce demand and stimulate supply. Just the opposite happens when price controls or other market interventions keep the price below its competitive level. Demand grows more rapidly and supply more slowly. Once a competitive market is re-established, price is higher for a time than it would have been.
Under these assumptions, nothing has to be done in the estimation of long-term price trend to account for market interventions. We then "only" have the problem that the artificial price swings caused by market interference, induce noise in the estimations, which lower the t-values and the overall fit, but have no effect on the coefficients to be estimated (the β's).
The alternative (extreme) assumption is that once the supply restrictions are relaxed, prices move directly back to their long-run competitive trend. That is, artificial price volatility has no effect on the long-term trends in either supply and demand. In this case we can estimate the true long-run price trend during periods under competitive conditions by omitting the years when collusion is in effect. Table 4 shows the results from such estimations when the CPI is adjusted by 0.0 and 1.0 percentage points a year.
As before, the coefficient on the time variable when no adjustment is made to the CPI, is negative and significant. When the CPI is adjusted by 1.0 percentage points, the coefficient is positive, but insignificant. Furthermore, the ADF test fails to reject the hypothesis that the series is difference stationary, raising the possibility of spurious results.
(6) Alternative Trends. The base case assumes that the long-run trend in real copper prices is linear. There are, of course, other possibilities. Slade (1982) , for example, argues the trend is quadratic, falling for a time and then rising. Yet another alternative is the inverse function, which has the advantage over the linear trend that it need not at some point become negative when prices are declining. It is more difficult to rationalise, however, if real prices are rising. To assess how dependent our results are on the assumption of a linear price trend, we estimated these two non-linear functions-the quadratic and the inverse-using equations 2 and 3. P t = β 2 + β 3 t t + β 4 t t 2 + ε t (2)
Since the ADF test is valid only when the underlying trend is linear, we used the Ouliaris, Park, and Phillips (OPP) procedure to test for stationarity. When copper prices are deflated by the adjusted CPI (using a 1.0 percentage point annual reduction) and the unadjusted CPI, this test indicates that the resulting real copper price series are trend stationary. This finding holds both when real copper prices are assumed to be following a quadratic trend and an inverse trend.
The Schwartz Criterion, which is conventionally used to compare the performance of different equation specifications, indicates that the inverse relationship provides a slightly better fit than the linear trend, and that both the inverse and linear trends do better than the quadratic. The inverse function, however, implies that the price of copper is gradually approaching some stationary or permanent level, which seems questionable when prices are rising
Whether one uses the linear or the inverse relationship, however, does not greatly alter our earlier findings. With the inverse function, the trend in real copper prices is significantly downward if no adjustment to the CPI deflator is made. When the CPI is reduced by 1 percentage point a year, the trend is upward, and the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level.
Of course, if the quadratic were the true long-run trend, this would have important implications for availability and prices in the future. The estimated quadratic trends reported in Table 4 indicate a decline in the long-run trend in copper prices until 1986 when no adjustment is made to the CPI and a decline only until 1890 when the CPI inflation rate is reduced by a percentage point a year. Thereafter, the indicated trends rise.
There is, however, little to suggest the true long-run trend is quadratic. The coefficients for the square of the time variable, as shown in Table 4 , are insignificant, and as noted earlier, the Schwartz criterion favours both the linear and inverse over the quadratic relationship.
CONCLUSIONS
Growing evidence indicates that the US CPI and other standard deflators overestimate inflation. The magnitude of the bias is uncertain; the estimates range from 0.9 per cent to over 2.0 per cent a year, and vary somewhat with the time period covered. Though most of the evidence applies to the period after World War II, there are good reasons to believe that real price series for earlier years, even back to the 1870s, are biased as well.
When the nominal price of copper is converted to a real price using the CPI with no correction for the overestimation of inflation, the linear trend over the past 130 years is downward and statistically significant. However, when the CPI is reduced by 0.5, 1.0, and 1.5 percentage points a year to correct for its upward bias, this finding is called into question. With the two higher adjustments, the estimated trend is upward and with the 1.5
percentage point adjustment, it is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.
Moreover, this finding is quite robust. It holds whether nominal copper prices are those reported by the North American producers or the LME. To what extent this finding for copper can be generalized awaits similar studies on other mineral commodities. Comparing copper price trends as conventionally estimated, however, with those for other mineral commodities provides some tentative indications. The real price of copper without any adjustment to the deflator, as we have seen, falls over the long run. In this respect it is similar to a group of other mineral commodities, including aluminium, nickel, and silver. Here the impact of adjusting the deflator for other mineral commodities is difficult to determine in advance. In the case of copper, we have seen that the long-run trends in real prices are constant or rising once the deflator is corrected for inflation bias. However, in the case of aluminium, nickel, and silver, the decline in the unadjusted price series is greater than for copper, and may be sufficiently large to persist even after adjusting the deflator.
Another group of mineral commodities displays an unadjusted long-run price trend that is more or less constant, neither rising nor falling significantly. This group includes petroleum, lead, zinc, and tin. Adjusting the deflator for these commodities, as we have done in the case of copper, would probably convert the stationary trend in real prices into a rising trend (although short-term fluctuations are quite pronounced).
It is important, however, to keep these results in perspective. Even if mineral scarcity is rising somewhat, what is truly surprising is that the price increases have not been greater. Given the sharp growth in population and the increase in per capita incomes particularly in the developed countries, the consumption of all mineral commodities over the past 130 years has exploded. Despite the huge increases in production that have made this possible, 16 the real prices of mineral commodities have not increased greatly.
Moreover, the price increases that may have occurred have clearly not prevented the world economy from growing strongly over the past century.
16 World copper mine output, for example, rose from under 0.5 million tons in 1900 to 13.2 million tons in 2000 (Porter and Edelstein, 2003) .
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The possibility that the real prices for many mineral commodities have been rising rather than falling over the past century has important implications for development economics as well as resource economics. In particular, the barter terms of trade for those countries that export primary commodities and import manufacturing products may have declined less than the available estimates suggest, or may in many cases not have declined at all. This is because the price trends for primary commodities, as measured by the standard price indexes, are largely free of the biases that beset the price trends of imported manufactured goods. For primary commodities, there is much less of an issue with quality change and the delayed introduction of new products. To what extent the upward bias in the prices of imported manufactured goods has produced a downward bias in the barter terms of trade for countries exporting primary commodities is another area that this study suggests is in need of attention. Gordon (1990) About half of all consumer durables. Low estimate assuming no quality change in non-covered items; high estimate same for all items 1947-1960 1960-1972 1972-1983 1947-1983 1888-1919 1919-1935 1935-1960 1960-1972 1972-1982 1982-1994 1972-1994 1960-1994 -0 All equations are estimated using GLS with a two-lag autoregressive residual. Some t-statistics are derived from White heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. All equations are estimated using GLS with a two-lag autoregressive residual. Some t-statistics are derived from White heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. 
